Public Investment in Developing Countries: A Blessing or a Curse? by Eduardo A. Cavallo & Christian Daude
 
Inter-American Development Bank 
Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID) 
Research Department  
Departamento de Investigación 









Public Investment in Developing Countries: 














* Inter-American Development Bank 









   2
 
Cataloging-in-Publication data provided by the  
Inter-American Development Bank  
Felipe Herrera Library 
 
 
Cavallo, Eduardo A. 
 
Public investment in developing countries : a blessing or a curse? / by Eduardo Cavallo, 
Christian Daude. 
 
p. cm.  (Research Department Working Papers ; 648) 
Includes bibliographical references.  
 
1. Public-private sector cooperation.   2.  Public investment.   3. Infrastructure (Economics).  I.  
Daude, Christian.  II. Inter-American Development Bank. Research  Dept.  III. Title.   IV. Series. 
 
 












Inter-American Development Bank 
1300 New York Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20577 
 
The views and interpretations in this document are those of the authors and should not be 
attributed to the Inter-American Development Bank, or to any individual acting on its behalf. 
 
This paper may be freely reproduced provided credit is given to the Research Department, Inter-
American Development Bank. 
 
The Research Department (RES) produces a quarterly newsletter, IDEA (Ideas for Development 
in the Americas), as well as working papers and books on diverse economic issues. To obtain a 
complete list of RES publications, and read or download them please visit our web site at: 
http://www.iadb.org/res. 
 





This paper analyzes the impact of public investment on private investment in 
panel of 116 developing countries between 1980 and 2006 using dynamic panel 
data techniques, finding a strong and robust crowding-out effect that seems to be 
the norm rather than the exception, both across regions and over time.  It is also 
found that this effect is dampened (or even reversed) in countries with better 
institutions and that are more open to international trade and financial flows. 
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that, while public infrastructure 
may be complementary to private capital in the aggregate production function, 
there are distortions associated with the public investment process that might 
render a crowding out of private investment in the course of building public 
capital stocks. These distortions, in turn, are more prevalent in countries with 
worse institutions or that lack trade and financial openness.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper tests empirically the linkages between public and private investments using a 
consistent dataset for a large sample of developing countries over almost three decades. We find 
a strong and robust crowding-out effect that seems to be the norm rather than the exception, both 
across regions and over time, as well as for a variety of econometric specifications and 
estimation methods. We go one step further by providing evidence of the country institutional 
factors that help to break up this negative relationship. Perhaps not surprisingly, these are related 
to aspects of institutional quality and access to international credit and markets, which are the 
main focus of the conditionality set by development banks in the credits granted to their clients 
in order to finance public works.  Thus, the results in this paper support the rationale underlying  
that conditionality: public investment per se is not enough to crowd-in private investment and 
thus, money spent on public works could easily go to waste or have undesired adverse effects on 
the private sector.  
The issue of the relationship between public and private investment has been a focus of 
attention in the literature at least since the early 1980s, and it is still the subject of considerable 
controversy. The main question explored by researchers is whether public and private 
investments have a different impact on economic growth. On theoretical grounds there is no 
clear reason why the institutional source of total investment levels should matter. However, if 
there are inefficiencies or distortions associated with the process of public investment that are not 
prevalent in the case of private investment, then the difference could indeed matter. For example, 
it is well known that governments in many developing countries often carry out inefficient public 
investments, or “costly prestige” public works programs (Robinson and Torvik, 2005). Along 
these lines, Khan and Reinhart (1990) develop an empirical growth model for a sample of 
developing countries that distinguishes between the private and the public components of 
investment. Their results support the notion that private investment has a larger direct effect on 
growth than public investment. Khan and Kumar (1997) discuss the extent to which public and 
private investment may be complementary or substitutes and develop a theoretical framework 
within which their respective roles in the growth process can be analyzed. They argue that 
complementarities may arise in the case of public investment in infrastructure, which increases 
the marginal product of private capital. Nevertheless, public investment in infrastructure may not 
automatically have a beneficial impact on private investment and growth. This might be the case,   5
for example, when investment projects are of dubious quality or when they are financed in ways 
that have an adverse effect on the availability of credit, the cost of inputs or macroeconomic 
stability. 
If the distinction between the institutional sources of investment matters for productivity 
and growth, then it is very important to understand the linkages between them. If public 
investment crowds in private investment (for example, because the construction of roads, or 
ports allows firms to have broader access to markets), then the relevant question in terms of 
aggregate social welfare would be how to raise the productivity of public capital via, for 
example, reducing the distortions that may hamper its effects on growth or focalizing public 
investment into sectors where productivity is conceivably higher (for example, public 
infrastructure). But if these distortions are so great such that public investment crowds out 
private investment, then the problem is twofold, because every time that public investment 
increases, productivity takes a double hit: on the one hand, average productivity falls because 
public investment in less productive than private investment, and, on the other hand, total 
productivity falls because there is crowding-out of private investment.  Therefore, the relevant 
question for policy purposes is what needs to happen so that the crowding-out effect disappears 
and developing countries can reap benefits from higher public investments. 
We are not the first ones to test the linkages between public and private investment. On 
this issue, Blejer and Khan (1984) test whether public investment crowds out or crowds in 
private investment in a sample of 24 developing countries over the period 1971-1979. They 
provide evidence that public infrastructure investment is complementary to private investment, 
while other kinds of public investment led to crowding out of private investment. Aschauer 
(1989), using data for the United States only, finds that for a given rate of return, an increase in 
public capital reduces one-to-one private capital, but at the same time it also raises the marginal 
productivity of private capital which, in turn, crowds in private capital. Overall, this latter effect 
dominates in simulation exercises based on an econometric model for US data, such the net 
effect of public investment (particularly non military spending) is positive. More recently, 
Everhart and Sumlinski (2001) explore the partial correlation between public and private 
investment series using an unbalanced panel of 63 developing countries from 1970-2000. They 
find a negative correlation between the two series (consistent with crowding out), and that the 
correlation turns positive in countries with better institutions. Erden and Holcome (2005) find   6
evidence of a positive correlation between public and private investment for a sample of 19 
developing countries over the period 1980 to 1997, and a negative correlation for a sample of 
developed economies for the period 1980 to 1996. Lora (2007) finds evidence of 
complementarities between public and private infrastructure investment for seven Latin 
American countries in the period 1987-2001.  
Despite important contributions to the academic and policy debates, these papers are 
based on results from rather small samples and employ empirical methodologies that fall short of 
establishing causality. One incremental contribution of this paper is applying an empirical 
methodology based on dynamic panel data techniques that is well suited for identifying  causality 
in a broader sample of developing countries using a consistent dataset.  
While Khan and Reinhart (1990) and Khan and Kumar (1997) suggest that private capital 
formation is more productive, and hence more growth enhancing than public investment,
1 this 
does not necessarily imply that all forms of public investment are equally productive, nor that 
investment in public infrastructure is necessarily better for growth than other forms of public 
expenditures. In particular, Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou (1996) develop a model from which 
they derive conditions under which a change in the composition of public expenditure leads to a 
higher steady-state growth rate of the economy. The conditions depend not just on the physical 
productivity of the different components of public expenditure but also on the initial shares. 
Using data from 43 developing countries over 20 years they show that an increase in the share of 
current expenditure has positive and statistically significant growth effects. By contrast, the 
relationship between the capital component of public expenditure and per capita growth is 
negative. They conclude that seemingly productive expenditures, when used in excess, could 
become unproductive. This, in turn, implies that if public investment is already above a certain 
threshold, further increases could dampen private investment even through the channel of the 
marginal product of private capital, which is typically considered the main conduit for crowding-
in. This suggests that the potential crowding out effect can be even stronger than suspected and 
reinforces the idea that the actual linkages between public and private investments are an open 
empirical question.   
                                                       
1 On this issue, see also Coutinho and Gallo (1991) and Servén and Solimano (1990).  
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Another set of papers has focused on the issue of the efficiency of public investment as 
well as on the role of good governance as a key determinant of the productivity of public 
investment projects. For example, Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) study the effect of public 
health and education spending on outcomes (child mortality and educational failure rate). They 
find positive and significant effects only for countries with good governance. Keefer and Knack 
(2007) find that public investment is significantly higher in countries with bad institutions, which 
they argue is a reflection of the enhanced rent-seeking incentives of governments in 
environments where property rights are less secure. Mauro (1998) studies if predatory behavior 
by corrupt politicians distorts the composition of government expenditure. In particular, he finds 
that education spending is adversely affected by corruption. De la Croix and Delavallade (2006) 
make Mauro’s empirical model more consistent with theory, developing a model where the 
composition of public expenditures is tilted towards physical capital and away from education 
and health, where the diversion of funds is more difficult. They also provide consistent empirical 
evidence for the model.
2 The bottom line from this strand of the literature is that the determinants 
and also the consequences of public investment decisions are tied to the country’s institutional 
factors related to “good governance.” Furthermore, the empirical evidence shows that high 
public investment ratios (as a share of total government expenditure as well as a percentage of 
GDP) are significantly associated with weak institutions. In this paper, we provide further 
evidence that good governance is a key factor mediating the relationship between public and 
private investment in developing countries, and we go one step further by providing evidence on 
other structural country characteristics related to the level of financial and trade openness that 
have received much less attention in the empirical literature.  
The reminder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a basic analytical framework 
to motivate our empirical exercise and main hypotheses. Section 3 describes the investment data 
in detail, and in Section 4 we discuss the econometric methodology. Our main results are 
presented in Section 5 and several robustness checks in Section 6. In Section 7 we discuss the 
main policy implications of our findings for public investment policies. Finally, Section 8 
concludes. 
 
                                                       
2 See also Robinson and Torvik (2005) for a theory of “white elephants,” costly prestige investment, projects with 
negligible social returns.   8
2.  Analytical Framework 
 
This section discusses briefly the alternative channels through which public investment can 
affect private investment, in order to motivate our empirical analysis. Basically, we outline a 
simple framework where two countervailing forces coexist as in Aschauer (1989). On the one 
hand, public capital is potentially a complementary production factor which raises the marginal 
productivity of private capital. This fact has a crowding-in effect of public investment on private 
investment. On the other hand, public investment requires financing and therefore could crowd 
out private investment via a reduction in the amount of savings available for private investment 
and/or its effects on the interest rate. 
In order to analyze these issues further, let us assume that the aggregate production 
function in the economy is given by (, ) FkG, where k is the private capital stock and G is public 
capital (e.g. infrastructure). Furthermore, we assume that the following conditions hold: 
 
0 0, 0,lim ,lim 0, 0 kk k k kk G kk FF F FF
→→ ∞ >< = ∞ =>      (1) 
The first four conditions are the standard INADA conditions, while the last assumption implies 
that public capital increases the marginal productivity of private capital. In what follows, we 
might also use a specific functional form given by a Cobb-Douglas function:  ( , ) FkG A kG
α β = . 
Firms contract private capital in a perfectly competitive market, such that they take the interest 
rate (r) as given. For simplicity, we assume that the rate of depreciation is equal to one, such that 
all capital depreciates during the production period. The firm's problem is to choose k to 
maximize: 
(, ) ( 1 ) FkG rk −+ ,         (2) 
which yields the traditional first- order condition that in equilibrium the value of the marginal 
product of private capital has to equal its rental cost: 
 
(, ) ( 1 ) . k Fk G r =+         (3) 
 
It is straightforward to show that, for a given interest rate, the optimal private capital 
stock is an increasing function of G. However, government investment has to be financed 
somehow. For simplicity, let us assume that total available savings in the economy are given 
by (,) Sr τ , where τ represents the total amount of taxes. Furthermore, we assume that savings   9
decrease with taxation( 0) Sτ <  and increase with the real interest rate( 0) r S > . The negative 
effect of taxation on savings clearly implies that the Ricardian equivalence does not hold, an 
assumption in line with the empirical evidence for developing countries (see e.g. Khamid, 1996). 
With respect to the positive effect of interest rates on savings, in principle there are clearly two 
opposed effects at work (income and substitution effects).  Actually, there is some evidence by 
Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén (2000) that private domestic savings decrease with the real 
interest rate, although interest rates are often not market determined and probably reflect other 
distortions in the economy that discourage savings. Furthermore, given that we also include 
foreign savings in S and that it is a well-documented fact that interest rate differentials are a key 
driver of capital inflows in emerging markets, the assumption is actually less restrictive.
3 These 
properties can also be derived in a standard neoclassical growth model, at least in the transitional 
dynamics as discussed, for example, in Chapter 3 of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004).
4 
Furthermore, assume that the government runs a balanced budget, such thatG τ = . 
Taking into account the equilibrium condition that savings has to equal 
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Given our assumptions regarding the concavity of the production function and the positive effect 
of the interest rate on savings, the denominator of equation (4) is positive, such that the effect of 










>         ( 5 )  
 
                                                       
3 See e.g. Calvo et al (2001), Daude and Fratzscher (2008) and Fernández-Arias (1996) on this issue. 
4 For a model with permanent growth effects see Rebelo (1991) and Stockey and Rebelo (1995). 
5 Observe that we follow the tradition in the literature by assuming that G is exogenous. A social planner would 
probably expand G if the inequality in equation (5) holds. 
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This equation shows that the impact of public investment on private investment will tend 
to be positive, the larger the impact of public investment on the marginal productivity of private 
investment given by FkG. Considering the Cobb-Douglas case, this derivative is given by 
11 kG
α β αβ
−− . Thus, the impact of G on private investment depends critically on the parameter β. 
Although this parameter could be interpreted as strictly technological, we think that the value of 
β is likely to vary systematically across countries. In particular, as pointed out in the literature 
review, governments in countries with weak institutions are more likely to invest in “white 
elephants” that have little positive spillovers to private sector investments. Furthermore, these 
countries also lack the appropriate institutional framework and technical expertise for evaluating 
the impact of alternative public investment projects, which on average would result in 
investments with lower social returns. Therefore, it could be the case that the parameter β is an 
increasing function of the institutional quality. Countries with good institutions would invest in 
projects with high social returns that have greater complementarities with private investment and 
positive spillovers. At the same time, given that 1 < β , then FkG will be lower, and thus inequality 
(5) less likely to hold, in countries with higher levels of public capital stocks G. Therefore, we 
expect more crowding out in countries where public investment levels are already high.  
Another important aspect is that the effect of public investment on private investment 
depends critically on the sensitivity of savings to changes in the interest rate. The equation above 
shows that this effect will tend to be positive and stronger if savings are very sensitive to changes 
in the rate of return of investment (i.e., high r S ). In the case of a country having good access to 
international capital markets, the interest-rate elasticity of the foreign supply of savings would be 
very high, such that we would expect to observe a positively stronger effect in countries that are 
open to international capital flows and well integrated to world capital markets. Actually, 
crowding out would be certain if savings were completely insensitive to movements in the 
interest rate. The intuition for this result is simple. There would be a basically a vertical supply 
of funds available in the economy and any increase in public investment would reduce 
disposable income and therefore the private investment by the same amount. 
Finally, if taxation has a detrimental effect on savings, it would be less likely to observe a 
positive impact of public investment. The closer a country is to the “Ricardian equivalence” case 
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(i.e.,  τ S  closer to 0), where taxation does not affect savings, the more likely it would be to 
observe a positive effect of public investment on private investment. Given that the conditions 
for Ricardian equivalence (e.g., perfect capital markets) are more likely to hold in developed 
economies, we expect public investment in developing countries to have a less positive impact 
onprivate investment. 
While the framework outlined here implicitly assumes that public investment is a non-
rival good, the literature has also considered the case where the government provides private 
goods/capital (see, for example, the discussion in Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). In this case, 
from an aggregate viewpoint there would be more substitutability between G and k, making the 
case for public investment less favorable. On the other hand, as argued by Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2004) and Fisher and Turnovsky (1998) public goods are often subject to congestion 
effects. In Fisher and Turnovsky's model, the long-run as well as short-run effects of productive 
government investment on the private capital stock depend on the way government investment is 
financed (lump-sum versus distortionary taxes), the elasticity of substitution between public and 
private capital, and the degree of congestion associated with public goods. In the long run, high 
degrees of congestion require a greater elasticity of substitution to increase private capital, with 
distortionary financing reducing the expansionary effect of public investment. In addition, in the 
short run there is an additional wealth effect according to these authors that might induce the 
private sector to substitute consumption for investment, leading to a short-term fall in the private 
capital stock. Thus, it is reassuring that a more structural intertemporal equilibrium model would 
yield similar predictions as those discussed in this section. 
 
3.  Description of the Investment Data  
 
The IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) is our main source for investment data. The WEO 
provides data on gross capital formation at current prices for developing countries disaggregated 
by institutional sectors (private and public). In particular, we consider the ratios of gross private 
fixed capital formation to GDP and gross public fixed capital formation to GDP available for 116 
developing countries between 1980 and 2006. A major advantage of this dataset is the large 
sample size. However, the dataset does not apply a uniform set of criteria for the type of 
investments classified as public investments. This might be particularly important for the case of 
public/state enterprises. We address this problem in our analysis in two ways. First, our   12
econometric specification includes country fixed effects, which eliminate differences in the 
definition of public investment. Second, we perform robustness checks using a smaller sample of 
countries for which a uniform definition of public investment is available.  
  In order to get a first grasp of the data, we analyze trends in five regions: Latin America 
and the Caribbean (LAC), Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. The list of the 
countries in each regional group is reported in Table A.2 of the Appendix. In Figure 1, we plot 
the simple averages of public and private investment ratios to GDP from 1980 to 2006 for each 
region. Several interesting patterns emerge from the data. 
In the case of LAC, while both types of investment collapsed with the debt crisis of the 
early 1980s, only private investment has since recovered to pre-crisis levels. However, despite 
this recovery, the ratio of private investment to GDP in 2006 (i.e., 16.5 percent) was not very 
different from the pre-1982 level (i.e., 15 percent), suggesting that private investment has been 
rather sluggish in the region. In Africa public investment as a share of GDP shows a downward 
trend, while private investment has fluctuated around the same (low) level of the early 1980s. 
For the case of Asian countries, private investment increased by 5 percentage points of GDP 
between 1980 and 2006 (i.e., 13 vs. 17 percent, respectively), while public investment as a share 
of GDP was roughly equal in 2006 compared to 1980. Thus, the surge in private investment 
observed in Asian countries appears to be delinked from the levels of public investment (albeit 
perhaps not from its composition). In Eastern Europe, private and public investments appear to 
be almost perfectly negatively correlated in the 1980s, delinking somewhat in the 2000s with 
private investment to GDP showing an upward trend and public investment remaining stable as a 
share of GDP. The timing of the delink is interesting because it coincides with a major process of 
financial and trade integration of the countries in Eastern Europe with the rest of the world. 
Finally, in the case of the Middle East, private and public investment appear to have moved in 
tandem over this period with the exception of a few years in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, 
when private investment increased while public investment declined, creating a wedge between 
the two series that would remain stable thereafter. 
In Table 1, we present some moments of the correlation coefficients between the private 
and public investment ratios to GDP by region, in levels, first differences and for the cyclical 
components of both series.
6 The results show on average a negative correlation between public 
                                                       
6 We de-trend the investment to GDP series using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.   13
and private investment, regardless of whether the correlations are computed using levels, first 
differences or are de-trended. In levels, for Africa and Asia the average correlations are close to 
zero, while Latin America and Eastern Europe show somewhat more negative correlations. 
However, all regions exhibit considerable internal heterogeneity. Within all regions, there are 
countries with a highly negative correlation and other countries with strongly positive 
correlations.  
The main objective of this paper is to probe deeper into these correlations and, in 
particular, to explore the causal link between public and private investment. To do so, we employ 
an empirical methodology that takes into account that these variables are possibly endogenous. 
In the next section, we explain the empirical strategy in detail.   
 
4. Empirical Methodology  
 
In order to evaluate the impact of public investment on private investment, we use system GMM 
estimators developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This 
estimation method is especially convenient in our framework because it allows for addressing 
two important econometric problems. First, it enables us to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
at the country level in a dynamic setup such as is commonly used for estimating investment 
equations, given the natural inertia in investment. Under these conditions, while unobserved 
time-effects can be isolated by introducing year-dummies, the traditional fixed-effects methods 
would yield inconsistent estimates. Second, many of the variables included in the equation are 
likely to be endogenous and determined jointly with private investment. Clearly, this can be the 
case of our variable of interest—public investment—which could react to movements in private 
investment or shocks that affect both investment ratios. Thus, given that our interest is to capture 
the causal link from public investment and country characteristics on private investment, it is 
important to deal with this problem. The system GMM estimator enables us to address both of 
these problems jointly. 










ρ αβ μ γ ε
−
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
′ =+ + + + + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
,  (6) 
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where 
P I represents private investment in fixed capital, 
G I  is public investment in fixed capital, 
Y is GDP, X includes additional controls, μt  represents an unobserved common time-effect, γi is 
an unobserved country-effect, and εi,t is the error term. In order to eliminate the country-effects, 
we take first differences in equation (6), which yields:
7 
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Observe that in addition to the potential endogeneity problem of public investment and 
controls, the error term in equation (7)  it ε Δ  is correlated with the lagged dependent variable by 
construction. In order to address this problem as well as the potential endogeneity of controls, the 
system GMM estimator uses a series of instrumental variables based on lagged values of the 
explanatory variable and the dependent variable, exploiting the panel nature of our dataset.  
The estimation procedure relies on the idea that internal lagged instruments can be found, 
given that they are weakly exogenous if they are not correlated with future error terms. While the 
lagged dependent variable is “predetermined” because it is correlated with past error terms, but 
uncorrelated with the current and future error terms, the other variables are potentially 
endogenous given that they are correlated with the current and past error terms, but are assumed 
to be uncorrelated with future errors. This means that predetermined and endogenous variables 
are uncorrelated to unanticipated shocks (future error terms), even though expected future 
dynamics may affect them. Under these assumptions, a possible set of instruments is the lagged 
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8  
However, as pointed out by Blundell and Bond (1998), the GMM estimators based on 
estimating equation (7) using these lagged level instruments (called the difference estimator in 
the literature) might be unreliable and biased in small samples. In particular, this problem arises 
when there is high persistence in the levels of the explanatory variables, because the lagged 
                                                       
7 We follow the standard notation by representing the difference yt – yt-1 by Δ yt.  
8 Of course, more lags for  3 t ≥ could be used as additional instruments, but we limit the number of lags to avoid 
over-fitting.   15
levels would be weak instruments of the first differences in this case. The system GMM 




it I Y and  , it X might be correlated with the unobservable component  i γ , the first 
differences are uncorrelated with  , ii t γ ε + .This is basically a stationarity assumption, saying that 
deviations from long-term trends are not correlated to country fixed effects. Under these 
conditions, lagged first differences can be used as instruments for the levels in equation (6). 
Thus, we can estimate a system GMM using the level and difference equations (6) and (7) and 
the corresponding instruments under the moment restrictions discussed above.  
In terms of testing the validity of our identifying restrictions, we perform two tests. First, 
we test whether the error term is second-order serially correlated, i.e., whether  t ε Δ is 
uncorrelated with 2 t ε − Δ , which happens only if t ε is serially uncorrelated.
9 The second test we 
carry out is a Hansen J-test which is equivalent to the traditional Sargan test but allows for 
heteroskedasticity in the error term.  
Finally, a potential problem with the proposed estimation procedure is that too many 
instruments can over-fit the endogenous variables and fail to isolate their exogenous component. 
At the same time, it also weakens the power of the Hansen test to detect over-identification 
(Roodman, 2007). To deal with these problems we follow Roodman’s suggestion of limiting the 
number of lags that are used as instruments, and also “collapsing” them into a single vector.
10 
This procedure yields a smaller set of instruments without a loss of information.
11  
 
                                                       
9 Observe that first-order correlation should be expected in equation (7), even if the error term in (6) is white noise. 
Thus, while we report also the first-order autocorrelation in our tables, a rejection of the null hypothesis of no 
correlation does not translate into a rejection of the validity of our instruments. 
10 All econometric estimations in this paper were carried out using STATA 10. In particular, we use the “collapse” 
option with xtabond2. 
11 We also perform the small-sample correction to the covariance matrix estimate. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and arbitrary patterns of autocorrelation by country.    16
5.  Results 
 
In Table 2 we present the results of estimating the system of equations (6) – (7) with different 
combinations of our baseline specification that—in addition to the public investment ratio—also  
include the three basic controls based on Servén (2003): the relative price of investment, 
domestic credit to the private sector as a fraction of GDP, and real exchange rate uncertainty.
12 
The first column of Table 2 shows a negative and significant impact of public investment 
on the private investment rate. In the short run, a one-percentage-point increase in the ratio of 
public investment to GDP decreases private investment to GDP by 0.17 percentage points. The 
implied long-run effect shows crowding-out with a 60 percent reduction of private investment in 
response to an increase in public investment.
13  
In column 2, we introduce the relative price of investment from the Penn World Tables 
6.2, measured by the ratio of the capital goods price index to the GDP deflator. According to 
theory, investment should be a negative function of the relative price of capital goods. In fact, the 
point estimate is consistent with this prediction, although it is not statistically significant. 
Importantly, the coefficient for public investment remains significant and close to the estimate 
presented in column 1. 
Next, we include a measure of financial development (domestic credit to the private 
sector as a fraction of GDP) which is associated with lower funding costs and a higher efficiency 
of investment. As expected, financial development has a positive and economically significant 
impact on private investment. The estimated coefficient implies that a 10 percent increase in 
domestic credit to GDP increases private investment by 2.3 percent.  The effect of public 
investment remains significant and similar in size to the previous specifications. Alternatively, 
we have also used the real interest rate from the World Development Indicators as an alternative 
proxy for the cost of financing. While this variable turns out not to be significant, the main result 
of the paper—ie., the sign, size and significance of the estimated coefficient for the public 
investment ratio—is robust.
14 
                                                       
12 See the Appendix for a detailed description of the data and sources. 
13 The long-run effect is approximated by the ratio α/(1-ρ).  
 
14 The problem with using interest rates is, as discussed in Servén (2003), that for developing countries in general, 
the role of interest rate controls and non-price-rationing mechanisms in financial markets is very pervasive, and thus, 
interest rates are uninformative of the true marginal cost of funds. 
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In column 4, we include the volatility of the real exchange rate as a measure of 
uncertainty, which in theory could have a negative impact on investment if investment is to some 
extent irreversible (see Pindyck, 1991, and Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). We measure uncertainty by 
the conditional variance of the residuals resulting from estimating a simple GARCH (1,1) for the 
variance and an AR(1) in the conditional mean equation of the real exchange rate (in logs) by 
country, as in Servén (2003). Column 4 shows that the results concerning the effect of public 
investment continue to hold. In addition, the point estimate for the volatility of the real exchange 
rate is negative, as expected, although not significant at conventional levels.  
Finally, public investment continues to have a significantly negative impact on private 
investment when including all three controls jointly in the regression (column 5). In line with 
economic theory and consistent with the results of Servén (2003), this specification also shows 
significant impact of financial development, while the other two variables show the “correct” 
signs but are not significant at conventional levels. Furthermore, it is important to point out that 
both diagnostic statistics tests—for serial correlation and the validity of the instruments (i.e., the 
AR2 test and the Hansen-J test)—provide support for the chosen specification.  In particular, 
they show that there are no traces of second-order autocorrelation and that the over-identifying 
restrictions are not rejected at conventional levels of confidence.  
In Table 3, we explore potential differences across regions and time periods. In column 
(1), we estimate the model for Asia only.
15 The results are very similar to the ones in the baseline 
case. In particular, public investment has a significantly negative impact on private investment 
while financial development has a positive impact.  In column 2, we estimate the model only for 
Latin America and the Caribbean. The results are again very similar to the ones in the baseline, 
with the only difference that now the relative price of capital goods has a significantly negative 
effect on private investment, while financial development is not statistically significant. The 
results for other countries, shown in column 3, are also similar to the baseline. Again, we find a 
significantly negative effect of public investment on private investment.  
Next, in column 4, we estimate the model excluding the highly indebted poor countries 
(HIPC) to check if our results are driven by the inclusion of these countries in the sample. The 
results show that crowding-out result is not due to the HIPC countries in our sample. 
                                                       
15 See Table A.2 for details on the countries included in each sub-sample.   18
Alternatively, it could be argued that the estimates reported so far conceal important 
differences in the effects of public investment over time. For example, many emerging markets 
carried out structural reforms and privatizations during the 1990s. In this latter case, a negative 
correlation between public and private investment might be driven by the simple substitution of 
public investment by private investment after the privatizations took place. While we explore the 
direct impact of privatizations in the robustness section, here we test if the results change over 
time by splitting the sample into three periods: the 1980s, the 1990s and the 2000s. The results 
are reported in columns 5-7. They suggest that the crowding-out effect of public investment is 
significant in all three sub-periods.  
Finally, we split the sample among countries with low, medium and high average public 
investment ratios.
16 As pointed out in Section 2, more crowding out should be expected in 
countries with already high levels of public investment. The results in columns (8)-(10) are 
consistent with this prior: the crowding-out effect appears only in the sub-samples of countries 
with intermediate and high public investment ratios.  
Overall, the results in Table 3 shows that the negative impact of public investment on 
private investment seems to be the norm rather than the exception, both across regions and over 
time. The only exception is the sub-sample of countries where the public investment ratios are 
very low. For this sub-set of countries, there is no evidence of either crowding-out or crowding-
in.  
What factors lie behind the negative relationship between public and private investment?  
In Table 4, we present a series of estimations that explore whether the impact of public 
investment on private investment depends on three structural country characteristics that derive 
from our discussion in Section 2. We perform this analysis by including interaction terms in the 
panel regressions of Table 2. Including these terms allows us to probe deeper into the 
aforementioned hypotheses. For example, suppose that one reason why public investment 
crowds out private investment is that in some countries public investment is wasteful and 
associated with corruption rather than productive investment (i.e., low FkG due to a low β), as the 
empirical evidence reported in several of the papers discussed in the introduction shows. If that is 
the case, then the crowding-out effect should disappear in countries with better institutions.  In 
                                                       
16 We compute the average public investment to GDP ratio for every country in the sample, and divide the sample 
into three groups: low, medium and high, where every group is one-third of the distribution.   19
order to explore this possibility we include an index of institutional quality from the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This index is a perception-based rating of experts regarding several 
institutional aspects of the country which are constructed to ensure comparability across 
countries. In particular, we consider the index on Political Risk which is reported on a scale from 
0 to 100, with higher ratings representing less risk. This index includes several dimensions such 
as government stability, corruption, bureaucratic quality, law and order, and political conflict, 
which have been shown to affect investment decisions.
17  
We test the impact of political risk on private investment in columns (1) and (2). In 
column 1, the measure of institutional quality is statistically significant with the expected sign in 
the regression. From an economic point of view, the estimated coefficient implies that a one-
standard-deviation improvement in institutional quality (e.g., improving Bolivia’s institutions to 
the level of Uruguay) would increase the ratio of private investment to GDP by 1.2 percentage 
points. In column (2) we also include the interaction term between this index and the ratio of 
public investment to GDP (Public). The coefficient of the interaction term is positive and 
statistically significant, such that the crowding out of public investment is dampened in countries 
with better institutions.  
The inclusion of the interaction term in the regression means that the net effect of an 
increase in public investment on the private investment ratio depends on the estimated 
coefficients, and on the level of the index of institutional quality. In particular the net effect of a 




























Δ β α                                                                  (8) 
 
where ∆ represents the change in the respective variable. Equation (8) says that any change in the 
public investment ratio affects private investment directly via α, and indirectly through the 
interaction effect with the control variable t i X , . 
  In Figure 2, we plot the estimated net effect of a one standard deviation increase in the 
public investment ratio for different percentiles of the distribution of the index of institutional 
                                                       
17 See, for example, Daude and Stein (2007) for an analysis of the impact of different institutional aspects on foreign 
direct investment. See also http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx for details on the methodology of 
the political risk index. 
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quality, using the estimated coefficients in column (2).  The results indicate that for countries at 
the higher end of the distribution of institutional quality (in our sample, countries like Botswana, 
Chile, Slovakia and the United Arab Emirates) the net effect of an increase in the public 
investment ratio is crowding-in of private investment.  
In columns (3) and (4), we perform the same exercise for de jure financial openness (FO) 
to test if the crowding out effect that we identify is related to a competition between public and 
private investment for limited financing sources. In principle, the availability of foreign savings 
serves as a way to relax the domestic financing constraint. This would be equivalent to 
increasing  r S  (via increasing the availability of foreign savings) or  τ S (via expanding the 
availability of portfolio choices to domestic savers in ways that might render the Ricardian 
equivalence more plausible) in the context of the framework in Section 2. Thus, we check if the 
crowding-out effect of private investment is dampened in countries that are more integrated to 
foreign capital flows. In particular, we use the “KAOPEN” indicator constructed by Chin and Ito 
(2006; 2007). This indicator is the first principal component of four variables based on a detailed 
analysis of the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Rate 
Restrictions: the existence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current account 
transactions, restrictions on capital account transactions, and the existence of requirements 
regarding export proceeds.  The indicator is computed annually and available from 1970 to 2006.  
We find evidence that is consistent with this hypothesis. In column (3) we show that 
when financial openness per se is incorporated into in the regression, it is positive and 
statistically significant. In column (4) we also incorporate the interaction of FO with the public 
investment ratio, and we find that the interaction coefficient is positive and significant, meaning 
that, as expected, there is a dampening effect.  
 In Figure 3, we plot the estimated net effect of a one standard deviation increase in the 
public investment ratio for different quintiles of the distribution of financial openness, using the 
estimated coefficients in column (4). The results are that for countries at the higher end of the 
distribution of financial openness (in our sample, countries like Peru, Qatar, and Mauritius) the 
net effect of an increase in the public investment ratio is positive, meaning that there is crowding 
in of private investment.  
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In columns (5) and (6) we show that we obtain similar results when interacting the public 
investment ratio with de facto trade openness (Trade), measured as the ratio of real export plus 
real imports to real GDP. These results suggest that in countries that are more open to trade, the 
crowding-out effect of public investment is dampened.  
In Figure 4, we plot the estimated net effect of a one standard deviation increase in the 
public investment ratio for different quintiles of the distribution of trade openness, using the 
estimated coefficients in column (6). The results are that for countries at the higher end of the 
distribution of trade openness (in our sample, countries like Malaysia or Panama) the net effect 
of an increase in the public investment ratio is crowding in of private investment.  
Although the three variables used in the previous regressions--institutional quality, de 
jure financial openness, and de facto trade openness—might represent independent mechanisms 
through which public investment impacts private investment, we need to be careful with the 
interpretation as they are all highly correlated. In our sample, the pair-wise correlation between 
any two of these variables fluctuates between 0.36 and 0.42. More in general, it has been 





6. Robustness Checks  
 
In order to check the robustness of our results, we perform a series of additional tests. First, we 
consider alternative estimation methods. We re-run the regressions using standard panel fixed-
effects; random effect; difference OLS; Pooled OLS with panel corrected standard errors and 
first-order country specific autocorrelation correction (Prais-Winsten); and difference GMM 
estimator. While these regressions are potentially mis-specified due to the omission of the lagged 
dependent variable as an independent regressor,
20 they are useful for checking if the results of our 
benchmark regressions are driven by the choice of the estimator. The results are reported in 
Table 5. Reassuringly, the significance of the crowding-out effect remains unchanged throughout 
all the alternative specifications.  
                                                       
18 See Aizenman (2008) and Aizenman and Noy (2004) 
19 See, for example, Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) 
20 In these regressions, we omit the lagged dependent variable as an independent regressor, as these estimators are 
not suited for dealing with the “dynamic panel bias”.  This arises because yi, t-1 is endogenous to the fixed effects in 
the error term.  
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Finally, we consider an alternative source for our dependent variable as well as public 
investment. As discussed above, our data on investment come from WEO, which in turn 
aggregates data from standard national accounts statistics. In particular, the definition of public 
investment is not always precise or necessarily homogenous across countries. For example, most 
standard measures classify capital expenditures of state-owned enterprises as private investment. 
In contrast, Everhart and Sumlinski (2001) build a new dataset on public and private investment 
for 63 developing countries that counts all investment undertaken by the public sector—
including through state enterprises—as public sector investment. It is based on complementary 
data compiled by the IMF and the World Bank. Thus, in the regression reported in column (6), 
we replace the ratios of public and private investment to GDP from the WEO for the data from 
Everhart and Sumlinsky (2001). The main results remain unchanged. In particular, the 
coefficient that captures the effect of the public investment ratio on private investment is still 
negative and significant.  
In Table 6, we include additional control variables to check if the results may be biased 
by omitted variables not accounted for by either the country fixed-effects or the time dummies.  
One such variable is the “output gap” which would be included in a financial-accelerator type of 
investment equation. We compute the output gap for each country/year as the difference between 
the actual real GDP and trend GDP, computed using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Results are 
reported in column (1) of Table 6. While this variable per se is positive but statistically not 
significant, its inclusion does not change the estimated effect of the public investment ratio on 
private investment.  
Next, in column (2) we check the effect of including the general government expenditure 
as a share of GDP from the World Development Indicators. The inclusion of this variable serves 
two purposes. On the one hand, if limited financing is part of the story behind the negative 
relationship between public and private investment, then public investment should not be 
different in terms of the crowding-out effect than other forms of public spending. At the same 
time, including this additional variable allows us to disentangle whether the crowding-out effect 
is driven by public capital expenditure or other types of expenditures. The result reported in 
column (2) is that the general government current expenditure ratio enters the regression with a 
negative sign and is statistically significant. However, the public investment coefficient remains 
negative and significant. It is interesting to point out that the government’s consumption   23
expenditure has a significantly larger effect than public investment (i.e., it has a point estimate of 
-0.234 vs. -0.131 for public investment), suggesting that there is less crowding out associated 
with public investment than with current expenditures. Assume that all types of public 
expenditure have the same crowding-out effect via the limited financing story. Then what might 
explain the different coefficients? The answer is that while all forms of public expenditures 
might render the same crowding-out effect via the limited financing story, public investment has 
some positive effects on private investment that dampen the effect. This is consistent with the 
analytical framework in Section 2. Recall from that section that public investment has potentially 
two different impacts on private investment: a positive impact via increasing the marginal 
product of private capital and a negative impact via the reduction in the amount of savings 
available for private investment. The fact that we find crowding-out for public investment 
suggests that the latter channel is stronger than the former. And the fact that the estimated 
crowding-out effect is smaller for public investment suggests that other forms of public 
expenditures do not have the dampening effect.
21   
In column (3) we include the central government balance as a share of GDP from the 
World Development Indicators. This could be an important variable, given that lower 
government balances imply higher future taxes—which could reduce the private return to 
investment—and/or a higher financing cost for private firms due to the competition for funds 
with the public sector.
22 We find that, as expected, higher government balance as a ratio of GDP 
is associated to higher private investment, but the effect is not statistically significant. 
Nevertheless, reassuringly, the effect of the public investment ratio is still negative and 
significant.  
In column (4) we control for the ratio of net foreign direct investment inflows as a share 
of GDP, from the World Development Indicators. We find that while the effect of FDI inflows 
on private investment is positive and significant, the effect of public investment remains 
unchanged. In column (5) we control for a privatization dummy that takes the value of one if 
                                                       
21 Or if they do have an effect, it is smaller.  
22 If the deficit is financed with external rather than domestic borrowing, the effect is still the same, as more external 
borrowing by the government raises country risk and, thus, the cost of financing for domestic firms. Cavallo and 
Valenzuela (2007) provide evidence that sovereign risk is an important determinant of the cost of financing of 
private firms in emerging market economies.    24
there were any significant privatizations during that year in the country,
23 but it turns out to be 
not significant and its inclusion does not change the results regarding the effect of public 
investment.  
In columns (6) and (7) we include some available measures of public infrastructure (or 
public capital stock): paved roads, and kilometers of roads per capita from the World 
Development Indicators database. We test whether the estimated crowding out effect of private 
investment might be due to the fact that (low) public investment is a proxy for inadequate public 
infrastructure. The results suggest that it is not. While these measures of public infrastructure 
have a positive effect, the estimated effect of the public investment ratio remains negative and 
significant. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that, while public infrastructure may 
be complementary to private capital in the aggregate production function, there are distortions 
associated with the public investment process  in developing countries (some of which we have 
discussed above) that might render a crowding out of private investment in the process of 
building public capital stocks. This is akin to the results reported in Blejer and Khan (1984), who 
argue, using a smaller sample of 24 developing countries, that while public infrastructure 
investment is complementary to private investment, other kinds of public investment lead to 
crowding out of private investment (more on this below). 
Finally, in column (8) we include all these additional controls together, and show that the 
crowding out effect of private investment remains unchanged. All in all, these results, together 
with the fact that the estimation technique also accounts for unobserved fixed-effects, give us 
reassurance that the results are not driven by omitted variable bias. 
 
7. Discussion and Policy Implications 
 
It is important to emphasize what this paper is saying and what it is not saying. First, we are not 
arguing that public and private capital are, or may be, substitutes in the aggregate production 
function. On the contrary, we acknowledge in the analytical framework and in the empirical 
estimations that there are potentially important complementarities between, for example, an 
adequate public infrastructure and private capital. Aschauer (1989) presents evidence suggesting 
                                                       
23 The information on privatizations comes from the World Bank’s database on privatizations in developing 
countries. 
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a strong positive role for non-military public capital stock in determining the rate of return to 
private capital, consistent with the hypothesis that public and private capital stocks are 
complementary inputs to private production technology. Similarly, a number of more recent 
studies have shown that improving infrastructure has a positive impact on output, particularly for 
developing countries. As might be expected, the greatest returns are in the early stages of 
development, when the existing infrastructure is poor.
24 Furthermore, we provide consistent 
evidence that public infrastructure (in this case, proxied by the availability of paved roads) has a 
positive effect on private investment. 
Second, we are not saying that all forms of public investment render the same crowding-
out effect. We do not have data on the composition of public investment to conduct a detailed 
analysis on the possible differential effects of various forms of public investment. On this issue, 
Blejer and Khan (1984), in their cross-country study of private investment for a sample of 24 
developing countries, suggest that public investment in infrastructure is likely to increase private 
investment while other types of public investment tend to produce a crowding out effect.
25 
Similarly, Lora (2007) finds evidence of complementarities between public and private 
investment in infrastructure for a sample of seven Latin American countries.  
Third, we are not saying that public investment is per se a bad thing. What we recognize 
in this paper is that building public capital requires investment, and that there might be 
distortions associated to the public investment process that crowd out private investment. We 
have made conjectures on the origin of some of these possible distortions and provided 
supportive evidence for these hypotheses. Public investment may crowd out private investment 
in certain contexts: for example, in countries with poor institutions, binding financing 
constraints, insufficient integration into world capital markets, and insufficient openness to 
international trade. Furthermore, in terms of its effects on GDP growth, as long as there is no 
complete crowding out, which we have not found in this paper, public investment would still 
                                                       
24 Notable papers on this line include Canning (1999), which uses panel data for a large number of countries, and 
Demetriades and Mamuneas (2000), which uses data for OECD countries. Röller and Waverman (2001), find that 
telecommunications infrastructure has large output effects. Similar results for roads are reported by Fernald (1999) 
using data on U.S. industry. Calderón and Servén (2003) present a similar empirical analysis focused on Latin 
America. They find positive and significant output contributions from three types of infrastructure: 
telecommunications, transport and energy. 
25 They approximate infrastructure investment with the trend of real public investment, and take the deviations from 
the trend as a proxy for non-infrastructure investment. 
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have a positive effect on growth, although it might not be the optimal use of resources from a 
social welfare viewpoint. 
There is also a more subtle point to be made: some of the investment required to build 
public capital stocks need not be entirely public in nature. The economic justification for certain 
level of public investment is well-known: some public services enjoy a substantial public good 
component, meaning that their production and provision has externalities, and thus the private 
sector would provide suboptimal amounts. But the role of the public sector as the sole provider 
and financier of public investment is more dubious. Isham and Kaufmann (1999) make this point 
very eloquently: “…as the public sector extends itself into lower priority areas (where the public 
good component is nonexistent or the private sector can provide these services more 
effectively)… the complementarities between public and private investments are 
circumscribed…public investments in certain priority areas are complementary to the efficiency 
of individual investments; in other areas, they may supplant private investments.”  Thus, it is not 
the quantity of public investment that matters, but rather the quality. In other words, not only 
must more money be spent on building public capital, but it must be spent more wisely, avoiding 




Is public investment in developing countries a blessing or a curse? The evidence presented in this 
paper suggests that the answer to this question is that it is “mixed blessing”: on average public 
investment does crowd out private investment in our sample of developing countries, and the 
result is very robust both across regions and over time. However, the “good” news of the paper is 
that the size and sign of the impact depends on a series of factors that are amenable to policy 
action: institutional quality and polices that relate to market access both in terms of trade and 
also in finance.  
The aforementioned structural factors, in particular in regard to institutional quality, are 
indeed the basis of the conditionality that multilateral development agencies often set when 
giving loans to national governments to finance public works projects. This conditionality is 
oftentimes criticized on the basis that it is an interference with national domestic affairs that 
should be outside of the scope of these institutions. The results reported in this paper suggest that 
this line of criticism has to be qualified as there are no guarantees that the loans provided by   27
these institutions will end up having the intended outcomes independently of the institutional 
context.  
  Public investments should ideally be focused on increasing productivity and 
competitiveness, searching for the areas where social returns are the highest and externalities and 
spillover effects are significant. The most important concern when it comes to infrastructure 
investment, for example, is project selection. Selecting projects with the greatest impact is 
critical; thus, it is crucial that countries set up institutions capable of doing adequate planning, 
cost-benefit analysis and ongoing monitoring and evaluation. If, instead, the focus in on quantity, 
then it is more likely that higher levels of public investment have undesirable collateral effects 
such as crowding out private investment with little productivity gains for the economy. This is, 
indeed, what our results seem to suggest:  on average, for the sample of developing countries 
covered in this study, increases in public investment tend to crowd out private investment. This 
would not be the case if public investment were either productivity enhancing or if there were no 
distortions associated with the public investment process.   28
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Figure 2. 
The Estimated Effect on Gross Private Fixed Investment of Increasing Gross Public 
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Table 1. Correlations between Public and Private Investment Ratios 
 































Region Correlations in Levels
Mean Median Std Min Max
Africa -0.05 0.03 0.45 -0.86 0.92
Asia -0.06 -0.05 0.47 -0.92 0.72
Latin American and the Caribbean -0.26 -0.24 0.32 -0.92 0.43
Middle East -0.13 -0.14 0.41 -0.73 0.44
Eastern Europe -0.28 0.55 0.55 -0.94 0.72
Correlations in Differences
Mean Median Std Min Max
Africa -0.10 -0.18 0.34 -0.66 0.75
Asia -0.27 -0.19 0.32 -0.92 0.31
Latin American and the Caribbean -0.19 -0.11 0.29 -0.80 0.31
Middle East -0.18 -0.25 0.28 -0.58 0.36
Eastern Europe -0.40 -0.34 0.37 -0.98 0.08
Correlations in Cycle
Mean Median Std Min Max
Africa -0.11 -0.16 0.34 -0.67 0.70
Asia -0.31 -0.35 0.33 -0.92 0.29
Latin American and the Caribbean -0.16 -0.09 0.30 -0.80 0.41
Middle East -0.19 -0.25 0.30 -0.58 0.46
Eastern Europe -0.38 -0.38 0.41 -0.99 0.18
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Table 2. Baseline Model (system GMM estimates) 
 
Dependent Variable: Gross Fixed Private Capital Formation / GDP
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )
(Gross Private Fixed Capital Formation / GDP) t-1 0.704*** 0.688*** 0.734*** 0.698*** 0.680***
[0.061] [0.054] [0.067] [0.054] [0.045]
(Gross Public Fixed Capital Formation / GDP) -0.172* -0.192*** -0.182* -0.175* -0.188**
[0.089] [0.069] [0.108] [0.095] [0.078]
Log (Relative Price of Investment) -0.01 -0.009
[0.012] [0.011]
Log (Domestic Credit to Private Sector / GDP) 0.023*** 0.022***
[0.006] [0.006]
Log(Real Exchange Rate Volatility) -0.000005 -0.0002
[0.0004] [0.001]
Constant 0.061*** 0.071*** -0.017 0.061*** -0.002
[0.013] [0.015] [0.026] [0.012] [0.023]
Observations 1928 1928 1928 1928 1928
Number of id 106 106 106 106 106
AR(1) (P-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) (P-value) 0.194 0.208 0.235 0.216 0.288
Hansen Test (P-value) 0.265 0.491 0.0525 0.325 0.175
Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                   










Table 3. System GMM Estimates by Sub-Samples  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Asia LAC
Other than 
Asia or LAC Non-HIPC 1980 1990 2000




High        
Pub. Inv.
(Gross Private Fixed Capital Formation / GDP) t-1 0.905*** 0.857*** 0.658*** 0.756*** 0.763*** 0.432*** 0.380*** 0.828*** 0.682*** 0.522***
[0.073] [0.053] [0.058] [0.057] [0.028] [0.008] [0.006] [0.020] [0.035] [0.054]
(Gross Public Fixed Capital Formation / GDP) : Public -0.272* -0.223*** -0.208* -0.198** -0.093*** -0.390*** -0.163*** -0.035 -0.163*** -0.361***
[0.144] [0.065] [0.115] [0.085] [0.030] [0.015] [0.008] [0.092] [0.026] [0.070]
Log (Relative Price of Investment) 0.007 -0.031** 0.005 -0.067*** 0.007 -0.028*** 0.005*** 0.027*** 0.015*** -0.072***
[0.025] [0.013] [0.014] [0.024] [0.006] [0.001] [0.000] [0.006] [0.004] [0.017]
Log (Domestic Credit to Private Sector / GDP) 0.010** 0.015 0.020** 0.027*** 0.020*** 0.016*** -0.010*** 0.021*** 0.01 0.017**
[0.004] [0.009] [0.009] [0.007] [0.006] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.007] [0.007]
Log(Real Exchange Rate Volatility) 0.001 0.000005 -0.0004 -0.00005 -0.00004 -0.001*** 0.002*** 0.0001 0.001 -0.001
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.0004] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Constant 0.006 -0.008 -0.003 -0.001 -0.031 0.070*** 0.134*** -0.056*** 0.018 0.088***
[0.028] [0.031] [0.037] [0.037] [0.019] [0.003] [0.003] [0.012] [0.020] [0.029]
Observations 279 511 1138 1379 595 896 437 566 656 706
Number of id 16 23 67 76 73 102 105 33 34 39
AR(1) (P-value) 0.050 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.008 0.020 0.007 0.001 0.0175
AR(2) (P-value) 0.679 0.45 0.313 0.593 0.321 0.859 0.45 0.0332 0.41 0.417
Hansen Test (P-value) 0.56 0.216 0.283 0.0542 0.368 0.428 0.917 0.514 0.397 0.249
Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4. Interaction Effects with Institutional Quality, Financial Openness and Trade Openness 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Gross Private Fixed Capital Formation / GDP) t-1 0.757*** 0.726*** 0.725*** 0.699*** 0.675*** 0.659***
[0.047] [0.044] [0.046] [0.041] [0.033] [0.033]
(Gross Public Fixed Capital Formation / GDP) : Public -0.116 -0.780** -0.165* -0.071 -0.224*** -0.534***
[0.076] [0.321] [0.096] [0.078] [0.063] [0.087]
Log (Relative Price of Investment) 0.011* 0.013* -0.011 -0.004 -0.007 -0.005
[0.007] [0.007] [0.011] [0.010] [0.007] [0.007]
Log (Domestic Credit to Private Sector / GDP) 0.009 0.010* 0.015*** 0.007 0.008* 0.006
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
Log(Real Exchange Rate Volatility) 0.0003 0.001  -0.0002  -0.0004 -0.001  -0.0004
[0.0003] [0.0003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.0003] [0.0003]
Index of Institutional Quality 0.001*** 0.0001
[0.0001] [0.0004]
Index of Political Stability - Public 0.013**
[0.006]
De jure Financial Openess 0.005** -0.006
[0.002] [0.003]
(De jure Financial Openess * Public) 0.140*** 0.0002***
[0.047] [0.00006]
(Trade Openess / GDP) : Trade -0.00001
[0.00006]
(Trade * Public) 0.004***
[0.001]
Constant -0.044* -0.002 0.009 0.025 0.014 0.045***
[0.023] [0.027] [0.021] [0.020] [0.016] [0.016]
Observations 1336 1336 1764 1764 1907 1907
Number of id 80 80 96 96 106 106
AR(1) (P-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) (P-value) 0.665 0.474 0.248 0.239 0.5 0.638
Hansen Test (P-value) 0.107 0.155 0.118 0.0941 0.156 0.167
Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent Variable: Gross Fixed Private Capital Formation / GDP
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Table 5. Robustness of Alternative Estimation Methods 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fixed Effects Random Effects Difference OLS Prais-Winsten Difference GMM WB Data
(Gross Private Fixed Capital Formation / GDP) t-1 0.531*** 0.716***
[0.025] [0.037]
(Gross Public Fixed Capital Formation / GDP) -0.370*** -0.360*** -0.374*** -0.374*** -0.309*** -0.149***
[0.087] [0.042] [0.073] [0.073] [0.043] [0.039]
Log (Relative Price of Investment) 0.007 0.005 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.025*** -0.009
[0.010] [0.006] [0.009] [0.009] [0.007] [0.006]
Log (Domestic Credit to Private Sector / GDP) 0.010* 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.026*** 0.019***
[0.005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005]
Log(Real Exchange Rate Volatility) -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.002*** 0.0004
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.0003]
Constant 0.120*** 0.117*** 0.002 0.002 -0.005
[0.021] [0.013] [0.003] [0.003] [0.018]
Observations 2027 2027 1895 1895 1800 833
Number of id 106 106 104 53
AR(1) (P-value) 0.00009 0.001
AR(2) (P-value) 0.423 0.022
Hansen Test (P-value) 0.507 0.117
Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6. Robustness Checks with Additional Controls 
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )
(Gross Private Fixed Capital Formation / GDP) t-1 0.668*** 0.709*** 0.645*** 0.707*** 0.655*** 0.585*** 0.608*** 0.580***
[0.041] [0.049] [0.043] [0.040] [0.040] [0.049] [0.048] [0.027]
(Gross Public Fixed Capital Formation / GDP) : Public -0.189** -0.131* -0.249*** -0.193** -0.203*** -0.314*** -0.238** -0.139*
[0.075] [0.078] [0.071] [0.075] [0.076] [0.107] [0.103] [0.081]
Log (Relative Price of Investment) -0.006 0.018** -0.013 0.021*** -0.01 0.012 0.008 0.027***
[0.010] [0.007] [0.010] [0.007] [0.011] [0.013] [0.013] [0.007]
Log (Domestic Credit to Private Sector / GDP) 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.025*** 0.017*** 0.023***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005]
Log(Real Exchange Rate Volatility)  -0.0002  -0.0001 -0.001 -0.001*  -0.0002 -0.001 -0.0004 -0.001**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.0001]
Output Gap 0.054 0.255***
[0.043] [0.052]
General Government Final Expenditure / GDP -0.234*** 0.137**
[0.079] [0.060]
Central Government Balance / GDP 0.03 0.112**
[0.022] [0.046]




Paved Roads 0.033 0.058***
[0.024] [0.014]
Roads (km) per capita 2.551** -0.228
[1.170] [0.393]
Constant 0.002 0.013 0.022 -0.033 0.002 -0.017 -0.006 -0.075***
[0.022] [0.021] [0.021] [0.024] [0.023] [0.027] [0.023] [0.015]
Observations 1928 1664 1857 1625 1928 893 930 647
Number of id 106 87 102 84 106 100 103 74
AR(1) (P-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.023 0.084
AR(2) (P-value) 0.272 0.37 0.303 0.172 0.3 0.643 0.588 0.625
Hansen Test (P-value) 0.238 0.102 0.114 0.255 0.249 0.599 0.463 0.474
Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent Variable: Gross Fixed Private Capital Formation / GDP




Table A.1. Summary Statistics 
 
             
Variable Source Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Gross Private Fixed Capital Formation / GDP WEO, IMF 2723 0.14 0.07 -0.01 0.51
Gross Public Fixed Capital Formation / GDP WEO, IMF 2723 0.07 0.05 -0.03 0.49
Relative Price of Investment Penn World Tables 6.2 2320 2.11 1.04 0.36 11.28
Domestic Credit to Private Sector / GDP WDI, World Bank 2505 28.79 25.06 0.00 210.42
Real Exchange Rate Volatility Own estimates, data IMF 2492 0.01 0.07 0.00 1.54
Output Gap Own estimates, data WB 2723 0.00 0.03 -0.46 0.27
General Government Final Expenditure / GDP WDI, World Bank 2255 0.15 0.06 0.03 0.55
Central Government Balance / GDP WEO, IMF 2837 -0.04 0.08 -1.51 0.59
Foreign Direct Investment Net Inflows / GDP WDI, World Bank 2133 2.17 3.49 -28.62 46.62
Privatization WDI, World Bank 2723 0.24 0.42 0.00 1.00
Paved Roads (Fraction of total roads) WDI, World Bank 1065 0.40 0.31 0.01 1.00
Roads (km) per capita WDI, World Bank 1126 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05
Index of Politacl Stability (ICPR) International country Risk Guide 1700 58.88 11.75 17.00 86.50
Trade Openess / GDP WDI, World Bank 2298 75.66 45.41 7.97 623.46





   42
 
 
Table A.2. Country List by Region 
LAC Africa Middle East Asia Eastern Europe
Argentina Algeria Bahrain, Kingdom of Bangladesh Albania
Bahamas, The Angola Iran, I.R. of Cambodia Armenia
Barbados Benin Kuwait China,P.R.: Mainland Bosnia & Herzegovina
Belize Botswana Lebanon India Bulgaria
Bolivia Burkina Faso Oman Indonesia Croatia
Brazil Burundi Qatar Lao People's Dem.Rep Czech Republic
Chile Cameroon Saudi Arabia Malaysia Estonia
Colombia Cape Verde Syrian Arab Republic Maldives Kazakhstan
Costa Rica Central African Rep. United Arab Emirates Myanmar Lithuania
Dominican Republic Chad Yemen, Republic of Nepal Macedonia, FYR
Ecuador Comoros Pakistan Moldova
El Salvador Congo, Dem. Rep. of Papua New Guinea Mongolia
Guatemala Congo, Republic of Philippines Romania
Honduras Côte d'Ivoire Solomon Islands Russia
Mexico Djibouti Sri Lanka Serbia and Montenegro
Panama Egypt Thailand Slovak Republic
Paraguay Equatorial Guinea Vietnam Turkey
Peru Eritrea Ukraine
St.  Vincent & Grens. Ethiopia
Suriname Gabon
Trinidad and Tobago Gambia, The
Uruguay Ghana














São Tomé & Príncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe  